Not every perspective is provable to everyone

Not every perspective is provable to everyone, attitudes are influenced by positions

People don’t see themselves under primarily biological terms, they say their culture and their social life is a proof of being more than just driven by instinctual biologically explainable factors. They say the have their mind, their spirit, their thinking.

A perspectival shift to not see nonhumanity under biological terms primarily, does not need a proof, it needs the will to take another stance towards our environment. Seeing nonhumanity non-biologically and as individuations of Life in its own merits, seems to be unwanted and is treated almost like a form of “blasphemy” against an almighty scientifical system of categorization in our current societies and their Zeitgeists. Stances, positions are however not a matter of proof so much, but much more of choosing a specific perhaps differing standpoint and a perhaps fundamentally different angle of perspective – and that might be one that can’t be proven to the other side, since their outlook is so much predetermined by their own interest.

In the case of evaluating the own interest and the interest of others, operating with proof to privilege one side while disadvantaging the other, forces us to think in one direction only. We assume that it is objectively proven or probable that for instance nonhumans lose less if they die compared to humans, or that it is objectively provable that the reasoning of nonhumans can be behaviouristically determined and would not be autonomous. Proof selects a supposedly objective framework of reference, if you chose another framework of reference you come to a different kind of conclusion: an example, the starkest one perhaps is the different perspective an ecocentric person choses versus a humancentric one at a given moment.

Collectivism, life, speciesism

How the process of life is being reflected

  • Regarding human life – some sequences are praised in extremes, while some sequences are faded out, being kept cloaked
  • Regarding nonhuman animal life – a taboo-zone within human collectivity , its continuously being suggested that their death is meaningless, compared to ours, considerations of justice are avoided
  • Ecology, discussed simply as something that has to sustain “us” humans

Gruppe Messel, Tierautonomie

Denial is part of the faunacide

Animal Rights keeps getting located too close to biology and the natural sciences, when it comes to explanations and definitions of nonhuman animal life.

Why aren’t Human Rights a matter of mostly natural sciences? Why do we see human actions as expressions of social interactional communicative meaningfulness in terms of culture?

The pure continued act of denying nonhuman animals their own cultures, in particular in context with their natural environments and habitats and the forceful separation of destruction of those respectfully … is part of the ideolgical faunacide.

Antispeciesist Animal Sociology

بسیاری از مردم
چرخیدن
برای آرمان های جمعی آنها.
حیوانات و طبیعت به آنها ثانویه است.
من با چنین افرادی مخالف هستم
من حتی آن را رد می کنم.

Ecosocial nonhumanity (1)


When > animal rights is just about supposed “instinctual biological entities” a.k.a. “species”, then no wonder if people keep reacting in defiance, as soon as practical human and theoretical nonhuman rights conflict > where RIGHTS could instead be a notion of an ethical equilibrium – as soon as the importance of how humanity and nonhuman animality factually interact with their ecosystems is being discussed.
ECOSOCIAL NONHUMANITY
Antispeciesist Animal Sociology

For the benefit of all nonhuman life

A world free of speciesism for the benefit of all nonhuman life as the foremost goal

In terms of Animal Rights and it’s problem field: speciesism, fighting for bettering the prospects of human survival doesn’t help a lot, because the reason why and how nonhuman animals are oppressed isn’t becoming a subject.
If we protested and criticized speciesism in the forefront, we would > implicitly discuss the protection of nonhuman habitat! The underlying rhetoric makes a difference in the goal reached.
Humanity actually sacrifices the integrity of all nonhuman life for their idea of survival. So we need humans who care about nonhuman life in a way that the direction is chosen > where all nonhuman life is being foremostly taken into ethically prioritary consideration.
Gruppe Messel, Tierautonomie

Earthworms and animal rights

We believe that if our common notion of animal rights excludes invertebrates, like earthworms, we need to a.) analyze the speciesist paradigms that segregate animality, and b.) question the legitimacy of a solely humancentric (ethical, legal and philosophical) conception of a fundamental “right” on life and freedom.
Antispeciesist Animal Sociology

Segregative approaches

Question about segregative approaches, such as specifically in the discussion as found in e.g. here https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3csydct

Mind we come from a radical antispeciesist approach, hence we need to ask this.

Question 1 about the saving biological diversity approach:

  • Are they for captive breeding programs to halt the extinction of some species? If yes, how do they see the problematics of zoos? Do such problematics matter in the discussion about extinction, its causes and how the driving forces behind natural destruction can be addressed?

Question 2 about the saving biological diversity approach:

  • Life is a net, yet equally individual lives are meaningful (with humans and nonhumans). Positively seen we understand how life is built as an interdependent net. Yet oppressive mechanism also function as a “net”, yet one of destructiveness, meaning: Wildlife stands amidst mechanisms of a systemic zoocide and ecocide. When we name the net of life, we should also discuss the destructive mechanisms of the socio-political scale and not just highlight biological functioning.

Question 3 about the saving biological diversity approach:

  • When we face destructiveness that targets and sacrifices biological diversity, why do we exclude the nonhuman lives that are barred from the natural spaces and locked into machineries? Why is the connection of destructiveness towards life being treated in a segregative way? For the sake of keeping up the notion of taxonomical richness? Definitely not for nonhuman life itself.

Antispeciesist Animal Sociology

Thoughts about Animal Languages


Thoughts about the Languages of Animals

Palang Latif

This text is also part of the Edition Farangis: Animal Autonomy E-Reader 1.

I can’t see how a term such as ‘animal language’ could pose a problem to anybody when it directly refers to an animal’s way of communication. I am however critical of people who ‘translate’ animals in stereotype ways.

Nevertheless I could apologize for using a word that describes the phenomenon that humans see as exactly the very one criterion which most sharply shows the difference between humans and all other animals. The word ‘language’ has evolved in the human mind and possesses as such its linguistic legitimacy.

The word ‘language’ belongs to one of the core conceptions of the most drastic forms of negative speciesism. Regarding this presumed ground I have to stand upon, I apologize for the insufficience of my attempt to communicate something for which I can insofar only borrow this word, and I dare to ask you to perhaps think of a second word ‘language’ – free of value in a sense – which would only describe what we may not be able to describe yet within the borders of our set of regulations as we have them currently in regards to language; I am well aware that people usually don’t want to accept that this one human term ‘language’ can be used tightly paralleled to animal language, and that so far the word ‘animal language’ has only be tolerated on a scientifical level to refer to human parameters that have been applied to animal communication.

Animals speak their languages, but what their languages consist of, could only be understood if we communicated with them on a level that allows them to use their language.

Animal languages work like human languages, where you can translate what you understand and try to put how-you-can-understand-the-message or that what you understand into your terms of your language.The same happens when I talk to any other individual: I comprehend what she/he/it conveys in the restrictedness or unrestrictedness of my own terms. My terms don’t merely underly semantics – though they might be translated back and forth into semantics, morphems and syntax. My own terms and concepts have, in spite of their belonging to my system of language, a restricted meaning. In a very basic sense I have to rely on that what I understand or confer to that what I perceive.

The languages of animals (there are more animal languages than human languages of course) are seen by us as having a super restricted meaning. If we take the position of the nonhuman side in general, we can say though that human languages are restricted in that they only apply to humans. And seen from a standpoint which takes into account the question of perspective, I can say that if I don’t understand a dog, it’s because she belongs to a different animal ‘group’ when compared to my human group.

‘Communication’ infers meaning to the act of communicating on any level of any sound produced by a communicative agent.

Does language necessarily have to be connected to the history, the past, the present and the future of human progress? Why should animals have ever evolutionary or in any wise chosen to contextualize their existence with the human existence? A being of an animal group or I’d like to say an animal culture, clearly differenciates that what is important to their own existence; and I would call this rather their philosophy instead of just an evolutionary occurence.

I find it permissible to use a word of the human language to describe something I witness, on an experiential basis, about the side of someone (animals) who uses another language. Also ,I prefer to call the expresssed existence of nonhuman animals a philosphy, since it is too simple and anthropocentrically self-serving to underlie animal existence pure evolutionary ends. I do draw from my personal observations which seem sufficient for me to make my own judgements in this case and to make a decision about what to think here.

Basically I think that everybody knows that animals have their languages, but that we usually deny that these languages, that we don’t understand, have any meaning at all. But how would we not deny any meaning of animal communication that would go beyond the notions that our societies generally have about even the being itself of animals; we deny the fact of a self-authorative being of animals in itself in it’s whole meaning. So, no surprise that we draw major qualitative lines. In terms of language, we create a complicated building of restrictions to exclude the nonhuman animals from the comparatively tolerant perspectives that we have in regards to the pluralism of human languages. (It’s ok for a human language to be completely different, just because it’s human.)

We deny another animal that it’s not instinctal, because it’s not a human. You can indeed call everything an instict. Still you can’t really prove that it is “instict”. You can just put the ‘supposed carrier of an instict’ in a setting where they are treated as such instinctual things and seen as such, and interpreted as such.

Possibilities

Human rights in favour of animal rights may hopefully be another way to convey that an opinion of a human majority can’t represent a truth about any individual animal and the whole animal groups:The animal individual itself is a truth-bearer since it exists, and simply by that it represents, through how it lives (in its own rights and in its own terms) a truth. Just like I judge humans I meet by the impact of truth (their actions are possible just by shere existence), I would want to be as just as I can towards the ways in which individual animals live.
Art doesn’t function through semantics, since there are shapes and colours!
Micky Mouse doesn’t function through semantics, since there are figures and action!
Snowball doesn’t function through semantics, since there is Lisa taking her seriously enough!
Music doesn’t function through semantics, since there is play and composition!
Oppression doesn’t function through semantics, since there are suppressors
Love doesn’t funtion through semantics, since there is understanding and misunderstanding
Peace doesn’t funtion through semantics, since there are underlying actions … And this array could go on and on. Anyway, and still this is all part of our language?

What we do when we speak about ‘animals’ and ‘language’ is: We reduce the complexity of animal communication to linguitstical terms into which they may not fit. Instead of admitting the existence and relevance of other communicative systems as being really independent from our systems and thus not explainable through purely and solely biologcal criteria (insinct).

I have compounded two things:

1. the function of the term ‘instinct’ as a) serving to restrict the notion of a socio-ethical plane as to only having developed in and being attributable to humans and ‘human groups/cultures’ and b) its intended reduction of the scope and meaning of communication in nonhuman animals to a biologically explainable and manipulatively determinable code,

and 2. I have defined linguistics as an inadequate means of setting general rules for a communicative validity.

Instincts and linguistics are things that are working in our systems of categorisation.

In regards to the self-cetegorization going along with this, I also want to point out that our own language does not base a) on merely a functional basis neither in connection to the agent that uses language nor in connection with the subjects that language seeks to deal with, and b) that our language might also not just be a compound of what linguistics (and maybe physiological aspects of speaking added or so) alone can make out of it.

Generally: Cultural (in a non-homocentric sense, i.e. implying “the natural” on an equal scale)) and individual aspects play a role too, as well with humans as with animals when communicating!

I do state again that the word culture can to my opinion also be applied to animals – if one allows a culture to be really and profoundly different [from “our” cultures] too.


The Image on top is from the illustrated story “Morgh va Tokhm” by Farangis G. Yegane.

This essay ist also on my veganswines.com site at: http://www.veganswines.com/andishe/animallanguage.htm and published in my veganswines reader 08 (Paddling of the Ducks educational press) in a printed form.

See also: The species-derogative ascription of instinct, http://www.simorgh.de/objects/the-species-derogative-ascription-of-instinct/

Speciesism as a structure

Speciesism as a structure

It’s useless to choose the same pattern, the same structure that makes up structurally the frame and the architecture of an oppressive system. But we see this happen in the environmental movement and we see this in the antispeciesist movements. The structures applied to convey informational exchange and communication of ideas and thoughts about the issues, create the effective outcome and establish the inner contents themselves. If you apply hierarchically drive structures, you repeat humancentric patterns in “that” specific sense of humanhood. People though have a huge inhabitation to omit classical, typical human hierarchical cultural patterns. And they convey and transfer these patterns contentwise onto the fields of their activism.

When the entire plurality of animalhood has a manifold pattern, we don’t assume their practical patterns of social self-organization, instead we discuss them on the level of our hierarchical cultural concepts. Culturally we create clusters of “fame” as markers of social importance, and the weight of the contents created and conveyed is predetermined and shaped thereby. With our collective constructs we practically demolish the reality of other nonhuman-shaped social constructs, by negating their effectiveness and relevance in our communicative, reciprocal terms. That means: we could learn from the specific social forms of (communicative – thus fundamental) self-organization of the individuals, groups, living beings and entities we defend.

The first inhibitor, also driven by our structural approach, is of course the definitions we imprint onto the nonhuman realsm, and the lack of a will to understand and open up toward others with their own social codings as the standard. If we prioritize dominant, nonhuman-derogative human value systems (as specific human value systems) we therewith inferiorize the values, the meaningfulness of other views and positions in this world.

What is a must in animal advocacy and environmental activism, is to let go the hierarchical patterns when we approach systems that exist in the not-human realm. Our own dominant patterns are not nature given and “for all to be swallowed”, our patterns of prioritization as a group of dominant human beings is restrictive and stifling as a structure itself. People who uphold our typical cultural speciesist (…) patters, that suffocate other perspectives, are dominant by exactly aiming at social denying and negating plurality.

Gruppe Messel